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Security Vulnerabilities of the Artificial Pancreas
Daniel J. Cooke, Andres Guzman, Brooklyn Mesia, Jacob Palmer, Shawn Shields, and Milan Zanussi

Proposed Cryptographic Solutions
Introduction
We live in a world of cyber-enabled, wireless devices that
enhance many aspects of life, including treatment of diabetes.
Type I Diabetes is a chronic autoimmune disorder characterized
by the destruction of pancreatic B-cells and subsequent
deficiency of insulin - a crucial hormone in the regulation of
blood glucose levels. Current treatment includes monitoring
blood glucose levels and administration of insulin injections, but
development of an Artificial Pancreas is automating the
maintenance of this disease. Implantable Medical Devices (IMD)
are shrinking in physical size which limits their storage, power,
and processing capacity resulting in the unsecure transmission of
data. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
has called for encryption algorithms to be considered as the
lightweight cryptographic standard to combat these
vulnerabilities. Our team implemented one encryption algorithm
with our simulation of an Artificial Pancreas.

Artificial Pancreas
(1) Continuous Glucose Monitor (CGM): records ongoing
blood sugar readings and measures glucose concentrations in
the interstitial fluid of the patient’s cells
(2) Control Algorithm (CAD): sensor readings are received
and analyzed to calculate the correct insulin dose required
(3) Insulin pump (cannula inserted under the skin):
administration of the correct insulin dose per that time
(4) Patient Effect: the patient’s glucose levels respond to the
delivery of insulin

Challenges and Limitations of
Artificial Pancreas System
● Insulin sensitivity varies due to time of day, stress levels,
exercise/activity levels, and food intake.
● Once insulin is in the body it cannot be removed
● Hypoglycemia
● Computational power and battery life
● Securing transmission of data between devices

Experimental Design

Securing Data Transmission
To demonstrate the need for added security features, we show
how an adversary can remotely suspend delivery of insulin,
command the pump to dispense insulin, and view personal
medical information broadcasted over an unencrypted channel.

Figure 4: Highlighted in red is the command to suspend the delivery of insulin and the pump’s response.

We built a simulation of the Artificial Pancreas to demonstrate
the vulnerabilities and to mitigate unencrypted data and
unauthorized access. The simulation uses Raspberry Pi
computers to imitate a control algorithm device and insulin
pump. Another Raspberry Pi uses WireShark, a packet analyzer,
to intercept the communication between devices. This design
allows us to encrypt the transmitted data and measure the
additional resources consumed by the security features.

The forking procedure introduced in Fork creates two separate
copies of ciphertext for the same corresponding plaintext, but adds
an extra constant to one of the copies of the block and encodes both
blocks using the same encryption algorithm and key. Each branch
can be regarded as its own permutation of the same set of
messages.
Theorem: Let F1: {0,1}n→ {0,1}n be the permutation performed
by the first branch and F2: {0,1}n→ {0,1}n be the permutation
performed by the second branch. Then the subgroup generated
by F1 and F2 is a subgroup of the alternating group on {0,1}n.

Future Work

Figure 5: The left shows asking the pump for setting information. Highlighted in red are the max Basal
and Bolus settings that can be exploited when commanding the pump to deliver insulin. On the right, the
pump has no indication that these settings are being accessed.

The preliminary actions of this project created versatility in the
experimental potential of lightweight devices. Further research
is required to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of the current
communication protocols, measure the resource consumption
of the APS design enhanced with security features, and to
compare the security and resource consumption of ForkAE to
other encryption schemes. Our goal is to propose a solution to
securing the Artificial Pancreas, transferable to other IMDs like
pacemakers, neurostimulators, and cardioverter defibrillators.
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Figure 2: Components of each Raspberry Pi in the simulation

OpenAPS Algorithm
OpenAPS is an open-source project to build an Artificial Pancreas
using older medical devices and a Raspberry Pi computer to
monitor glucose levels and deliver insulin.

Figure 6: The pump can be commanded to deliver insulin. The terminal warns that this command is
very dangerous, even though no further authentication is required.

Fork: Authenticated Encryption
ForkAE is a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme
optimized for short messages. Fork is a 2nd-round candidate
for the NIST Lightweight Cryptographic Standard. In [1], it is
claimed that Fork is an appropriate cryptosystem for resource
constrained devices including IMDs. Figure 7 depicts the
mathematical structure of one round of Fork.

Figure 1: The loop and communication channels of the Artificial Pancreas System [5]

Fork: Security Analysis

Figure 3: Example of the hardware used in an OpenAPS system [4]

Figure 7: Structure of one round of Fork [1]
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